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tulates. Newton's New Theory About Light and Colors
exemplifies experimental method; and Huygen's Treatise
on Light shows the influence of the introduction of hypothetical entities ("waves" of light) .
If the question were directed to the Newtonian model,
and Newtonian aims, the answer, based upon the Principia would have to be yes for that aspect and phase of
physics. The method as Newton saw it was well defined.
The aim was to give an axiomatic deductive systematic
account of the motions of bodies.
We now find the following statement made with respect to theoretical physics: "The purpose of theoretical
physical science is to postulate a conceptual model of
nature from which the observed behavior may be predicted quantitatively." (Scientific Monthly, Vol. 81, No.
1, July 1955.) "The method is (i) postulate a model
based on existing experimental measurements; (ii) check
the predictions of this model against further measurements; and (iii) adjust or replace the model as required
by new measurements. - No claim is made about the
"reality" of the model; the sole criterion is successful
prediction from the simplest or most convenient or most
satisfying model." (Marshall J. Walker, "An Orientation
Toward Modern Physical Theory") . It is Walker's view
that this method is the result of a continuous, cumulative

and corrected, scientific process. The creative work of
scientists is in the postulation of the new model and in
the ingenuity needed to test it. "Understanding a model"
is defined as regarding it as a special case of a more general model.

To summarize: Predictive success, while counting as
one of the aims of scientific inquiry, exists alongside other
aims, among these to give an explanation of the predictive success of a model or theory. There is no universal
recipe or set of methods that is valid for all science at all
times because the aims of science vary, and because science is in part creative and inventive as well as developmental. Speculative imagination, logical techniques, computational skill and invention, controlled observation, an
intuitive "sense" of evidence, and new conceptual ideas
and ideals, all figure in the methods of scientific inquiry.
Predictive success is only one of the aims of model, or
theory construction; it is only one of the criteria of "rational understanding." What is taken to be "rational"
and "natural" may change, as well as the aims of science.
New aims may generate new methods both of discovery
as well as of explanation. New techniques - logical, computational, experimental - may generate new demands
upon acceptance and rejection of scientific aims.

Is There a Well Defined Scientific Method?
A Physicist's Answer
RUSSELL K. HOBBIE
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis
ABSTRACT - The traditional view of the scientific method is on oversimplification that ignores the
vagaries of the creative process. Several examples that indicate the method is not infallible
ore explored. The reasons why the misconception is so widespread ore discussed.

From the viewpoint of a physicist, the answer to the
que~tion "Is there a well defined scientific method?"
would be "No." Before justifying this answer, however,
we must define what we are saying "no" to. Many elementary science texts carry on at great length about the
"scientific method" as an objective, foolproof procedure
for proceeding from ignorance to knowledge. The "Method" allows the scientist to proceed from observation to
hypothesis to prediction to another observation, in a never-ending spiral of progress.
Certainly, in the broadest sense, this is the way by
which scientists make discoveries. In fact, for a simple
problem (such as diagnosing the trouble in a faulty piece
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of laboratory equipment) it may work quite well. But a
scientist trying to make a significant discovery finds that
the real world is just too complicated, and that progress
is neither as objective nor as guaranteed as the "method"
would supposedly make it.
One can easily think of six reasons why the "method"
is an oversimplification.
1. The key observation may result from an accident.
This breaks the link between prediction and observation.
Any practicing physicist knows that an experiment is
often performed, not to verify some prediction, but because it seems like an easy one to do or because the apparatus is available. In other cases, the interesting result
may be the unexpected byproduct of some other work.
A famous example is the discovery of electron diffraction by Davisson and Germer ( 1927) . To quote their
paper:
The investigation reported in this paper was begun as
the result of an accident which occurred in this laboratory
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in April 1925. At that time we were continuing an investigation first reported in 1921, of the distribution-in-angle
of electrons scattered by a target of ordinary ( polycrystalline) nickel. During the course of this work a liquidair bottle exploded at a time when the target was at high
temperature; the experimental tube was broken and the
target heavily oxidized by the inrushing air. The oxide
was eventually reduced and a layer of the target removed
by vaporization, but only after prolonged heating at various high temperatures in hydrogen and in vacuum.
When the experiments were continued it was found
that the distribution-in-angle of the scattered electrons
had been completely changed.

A few months later, Sir George Thomson (1961) found
the same effect in a planned series of investigations, but
his finding did not alter the fact that the initial discovery
was accidental.
2. It is impossible to remove the scientist's bias. A scientist may do an experiment and prepare the results for
publication, discussing in great detail all the effects he
can think of that might have distorted the results. He will
not rest until he has what seems to him an invulnerable
argument. But someone else who looks at his paper will
immediately ask, "Why didn't you do thus-and-so?" Similarly, a theorist will spend months doing a very careful
calculation; and it will be criticized, not on the calculation, but on the initial assumptions that the worker felt
were reasonable beyond question. This problem is discussed extensively by Polanyi ( 1964).
3. Experiments are often done, not to test some hypothesis, but in hopes of finding a "clue." This practice also
breaks the link between theory and observation . Textbooks, for example, often imply that Bohr postulated the
existence of energy levels in atoms, and that in response
to his ideas Franck and Hertz did experiments to find
them. In Franck's own words:
It might interest you that when we made the experiments
that we did not know Bohr's theory. We had neither read
nor heard about it. We had not read it because we were
negligent to read the literature well enough - and you
know how that happens. On the other hand, one would
think that other people would have told us about it. For
instance we had a colloquium at that time in Berlin at
which all the important papers were discussed. Nobody
discussed Bohr's theory. Why not? The reason is that fifty
years ago one was so convinced that nobody would, with
the state of knowledge we had at that time, understand
spectral line emission, so that if somebody published a
paper about it, one assumed, "Probably it is not right."
So we did not know it. But we made that experiment
(and got the result that confirmed Bohr's theory) because
we hoped that if we found out where the borderline between elastic and inelastic impact lies . . . only one line
might appear. But we did not know whether that would
be so, and we did not know whether at all an emission of
an atom is of such a type that one line alone can be emitted and all the energy can be used for that one purpose.
The experiment gave it to us, and we were surprised about
it. But we were not surprised after we read Bohr's paper
later, after our publication (Holton, 1961).

4. There is a conservatism in science that makes scien-
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tis ts of ten reluctant to accept a new idea or test a new
hypothesis. We see an example of this in Professor
Franck's candid statement above. When de Broglie proposed that assigning wave properties to matter could explain Bohr's energy levels in the hydrogen atom, he was
largely ignored. In fact, his examiners were reluctant to
pass him, and did so only because Einstein said his work
had merit. One of his examiners, Charles Manguin, wrote
the following:
when the thesis was presented I did not believe in the
physical reality of the waves associated with the particles
of matter. I saw in them rather pure creations of the
mind. . . . Only after the experiments of Davisson and
Germer ( 1927) , of G.P. Thomson ( 1928) and only when
I held in my hand the beautiful photographs (electron
diffraction patterns from thin layers of ZnO), which
Ponte had succeeded in making in the Ecole Normale,
did I understand how inconsistent, ridiculous and nonsensical my attitude was (Polanyi, 1964: 149).

Yet this conservatism must not be condemned, for often
the scientist must ignore some facts if he is to make any
progress:
However shockingly, awkward facts may on occasion be
wise'ly ignored ; and, in making a beginning, irreducibly
vague concepts prove often immeasurably superior to logically impeccable categories that presuppose all need for
investigation is at an end . An obsessive concern with methodological chasity does not often eventuate in scientific
fecundity (Nash, 1963 : 169) .

5. Most of the really significant advances come in
spurts that cannot be predicted or invoked. These spurts
have been called "Eureka episodes" by Nash. The "method" provides no recipe for having one. This is the problem of creativity, and it appears that only a few scientists are creative enough to make the big advances. Their
efforts create work for the less gifted, filling in the rest
of the structure. Max Born has described it thus:
I believe that there is no philosophical highroad in science, with epistemological signposts. No, we are in a jungle and find our way by trial and errors, building our road
behind us as we proceed. We do not find signposts at
crossroads, but our own scouts erect them, to help the
rest (Nash, 1963: 168).

6. Some of the radical new concepts may remain incommunicable to one's colleagues. This is a shocking
statement to one who believes in the objectivity of the
"scientific method," but it is unfortunately true. Polanyi
gives an example:
Cantor's proofs traversed a logical gap across which only
those willing to enter into their meaning and capable of
grasping it could follow him. Reluctance or incapacity to
do so caused divisions among mathematicians, similar to
those which arose between van't Hoff and Kolbe on the
subject of the asymmetric carbon atom, or between Pasteur and Liebig on that of fermentation as a vital function of yeast. Hadamard describes how he and the great
Lebesgue, finding themselves on opposite sides of this dispute, were compelled to recognize the impossibility of understanding each other. "We could not avoid the conclusion that what is evident - the very starting point of certitude in every domain of thought - had not the same
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meaning for him and for me." The fundamental conceptual changes involved in Cantor's work were so repulsive
to Kroneker, who dominated German mathematics in the
1880's, that he barred Cantor from promotion in all German universities and even from having his papers published in any German mathematical journal. Hadamard
confesses that in another field of great modern discoveries,
the theory of groups, " though being eventually able to use
it for simple applications, he met with insuperable difficulty in mastering more than a rather elementary and superficial knowledge of it" (Polanyi, 1964: 190) .

If new ideas cannot always be accepted because of their
compelling logic, how then, do they gain acceptance?
Planck has described the process:
An important scientific innovation rarely makes its way by
gradual.ly winning over and converting its opponents: it
rarel y happens that Saul becomes P aul. What does happen
is that its opponents gradually die out and that the growing generation is familiarized with the idea from the beginning : . .. (Nash, 1963:272) .

To close, we might ask why the oversimplified misconception of scientific progress is so widespread. There are
two very important reasons : First, individuals write scientific papers to convince, and they therefore cast their
papers in the format of the "method." Once point B is
known, the "method" provides a direct way of proceeding from point A to point B. Secondly, textbook writers
often fail to consult original sources. If the vast amount
of new scientific information is to be consolidated into a
form that can be assimilated, they can't. But this process
filters out any references to the real method of discovery
that might have remained in the original report.
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My plea, then, is not for everyone to teach all the history of science, but to refrain from pretending to teach
history or method when it has been distorted by simplification.
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